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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the impact of macro fluctuation on firm’s balance sheet to 
understand firm’s net worth as well as the corporate distress probability. We argue that 
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1. Introduction 
Several studies, both empirical and theoretical, have been mobilized to understand 
what happened in the 1997 Asian crisis. Some studies accentuate on the macroeconomic 
weaknesses, for instance, by linking speedy financial liberalization and unsound regulation or 
supervision on banking and financial institutions. However, it is irresponsible to blame macro 
economic variables as a single factor provoking financial turbulence. 
Meanwhile, some strands of studies focus on micro side of the story of crises. In these 
strands, corporate sector vulnerabilities, indicated by weak performance and high leverage 
accompanied by the poor governance system have frequently been cited as main sources of 
Asian crisis. In hindsight, Claessens, Djankov and Xu (2000) explain that it has become 
apparent that the corporate financial structure of many companies was too weak to withstand 
the combined shocks of increased interest rates, devalued currencies, and sharp declines in 
domestic demand. Corporate financing policies and performance in response to external 
shocks such as falls in aggregate demand and increases in interest rate pay a major attention in 
understanding how crisis devastated countries in East-Asian region or other regions, such as 
Latin American countries. 
This chapter intends to investigate empirically the corporate responses to the currency 
crises in Southeast Asian countries by focusing on the case of Indonesia. Theoretical and 
empirical works, for example Aguiar (2004), show that basically currency depreciation could 
affect firm sector by two principal channels, namely competitiveness effect and net worth or 
balance sheet effect. In some cases, depreciation gives a competitive effect when it is 
followed by a surge in export performance and improvement in economic growth. While, in 
other cases the depreciation were followed by a decline in production activities, including 
tradable or exportable firms, which is accompanied by severe recession. The latter case is 
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mostly due to the financing constraints of the corporate sector to pursue their investment 
activities. 
The objective of the chapter is twofold, firstly it engages in the impact of 
“extraordinary” currency depreciation on the firm sector in Indonesia, and second, it is 
concerned with the impact of debt-equity ratio of the firms on their firm value, due to 
currency depreciation. Subsequently, this chapter also examines the factors inducing the 
likelihood of corporate distress. Basically, this chapter argues that firms with higher debt-
equity ratio will have lower profitability when currency depreciation is present. This study 
employs econometrical analysis of panel data for 238 firms listed in Jakarta Stock Exchange 
(JSX) with 5 consecutive years for the period of 1994 – 2004.  
 
2. Related Studies 
2.1. Asian vulnerability 
Pomerleano (1998) demonstrates that Indonesia is a country with highest rate of 
change in tangible fixed asset where the average between the period of 1992 to 1996 was 33 
percent. Thailand is in the second rank with 29 percent average fixed asset growth. The 
question is where the main source of this high rate of investment came from. And the answer 
is external debt. Average debt-equity ratio to investment is high for Asian countries: Thailand 
(78 percent), Korea (69 percent) and Indonesia (67 percent), which means that most 
investment in these countries was financed by external debts (Pomerleano, 1998).  
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Figure 1. Average Change in Tangible Fixed Assets, 1992-96 
 
Source: World Bank staff calculations based on the Financial Times Information’s Extel database; taken 
from Pomerleano (1998).  
 
Figure 2. Average Corporate Leverage, 1996 
 
Note: Data are for December 31 
Source: World Bank staff calculations based on the Financial Times Information’s Extel 
database; taken from Pomerleano (1998). 
 
Unsustainable rapid investment in fixed asset was financed by excessive borrowing. 
For comparison, the average ratio is 8 percent in USA and 6 percent in Germany. Latin 
American countries, over all, have 19 percent average ratio.  
Indonesia is one of the countries with high rate of firm-level profitability. Claessens et 
al. (1998) document that the average of Return on Asset (ROA) in local currency of Indonesia 
during 1988 – 1996 was 7.1 percent, 9.8 percent in Thailand, and 7.9 in Philippines. For 
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comparison, ROA in US in the same period was 5.3 percent, and Germany 4.7 percent. If it is 
measured by ROA in US currency the average ROA in the same period was higher than ROA 
in local currency. 13.0 percent in Indonesia, 17.2 percent in Philippines and 14.7 in Thailand.  
Operating margin of the three countries was also high, Indonesia had 32.9 percent of 
operating margin, Thailand had 25.2 percent and Philippines had 27.7 percent. For 
comparison, operating margin in same period was just 14.4 percent in US and 14.6 in 
Germany.  The same tendency was in real sales growth.  
 Meanwhile, Harvey and Roper (1999) describe also that stock exchange in Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Thailand increased their market capitalization by 
factors of 10, 5, 12, 2, and 3 respectively. The growth of market capitalization of Asian stock 
markets, with the exception of Taiwan ad Korea, exceeded the 270 percent growth rate that 
emerging markets as a group posted during the same period. Overall, local Asian stock 
markets increased their market capitalization at a faster pace than most developed markets.  
 To be compared with the combined stock markets in Latin American countries, Asian 
stock markets were four times, even though the growth of stock markets in Latin America was 
higher than those in Asian countries.  Furthermore, Harvey and Roper (1999) also mention 
that the increase in market capitalization on the Latin American stock exchanges resulted 
primarily from share price appreciation, while on the Asian markets market capitalization in 
large part increased through the successful floatation of new equity offerings.  
  Harvey and Roper (1999) also describe that in the period of 1990 to 1996 equity 
markets in Indonesia and Thailand were more aggressive in issuing shares relative to the 
larger markets in East Asia.   
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 In Latin America, the ratio of total value of new equity to market capitalization 
averages 1.41 percent between 1990 and 1996, while in Asia, the ratio averaged 2.89 percent 
during the same period.  
 Economic value added is commonly used to measure the corporate sector profitability. 
EVA is net operating profits after taxes minus the cost of capital, including borrowed capital 
and equity capital, used to generate those profits.  
 
Figure 3. Average Economic Value Added, 1992 - 1996 
 
 Note: Calculated as return on capital employed minus the lending rate 
Source: World Bank staff calculations based on the Financial Times Information’s Extel database; taken 
from Pomerleano (1998).   
 
The following table shows the result of Altman’s Z Score2 for several countries. The Z 
Score use of multiple discriminant analysis (MDA) is modelled to predict corporate distress. 
Pomerleano (1998) in this result of Z Score use the old-fashioned formula.  Z-Score statistical 
technique use five ratios of the corporate financial statements, namely return on total assets, 
                                                 
2 Edward I. Altman, The Z-Score Bankruptcy Model: Past, Present, and Future (New York: John 
Wiley & Sons, 1977, and Corporate Financial Distress and Bankruptcy, 2nd edition (New York: John 
Wiley & Sons, 1993.   
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sales to total assets, equity to debt, working capital to total assets, and retained earnings to 
total assets.  
Table 1. Altman’s Z-Score 
 
Source: Pomerleano (1998) 
 
2.2. Currency depreciation 
Recent crises in emerging markets have highlighted the role of the corporate sector in 
transmitting financial shocks to the macro economy. The central mechanism is relied on the 
reciprocal relation between corporate net worth and macro fluctuation such as currency 
depreciation. Depreciation devastates corporate balance sheet, and subsequently by net worth 
effect of corporate balance sheet, micro sector condition could propagate the mechanism of 
crisis. Balance sheet effects basically bear if a firm has far more leverage than its capacity to 
repay the debts.  
The firm’s balance sheet healthiness is considered as an important factor inducing 
economic vulnerability. Dornbusch (2001) mention that there are three primary sources of 
vulnerability: a substantially misaligned exchange rate, balance sheet problems in the form of 
nonperforming loans, and balance sheet problems in the form of mismatched exposure.  
Mismatched exposures contain maturity mismatches leading to liquidity problem and 
currency mismatches.  
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There is a link between misaligned exchange rate and corporate balance sheet. In this 
research, we are concerned with the impact of currency depreciation and corporate balance 
sheet. Currency depreciation itself actually is not necessarily a cause of the crisis. There is a 
good depreciation and a bad one. Bad depreciation, by definition, is that a rapid real 
appreciation, over 2 or 3 years, amounting to 25 percent or more, and an increase in the 
current account deficit that exceed 4 percent of GDP, without the prospect of a correction, 
takes a country into the red zone (Dornbusch, 2001). Bad depreciation leads to currency crisis.  
In general term, currency crisis could be defined as rapid outflows of financial capital 
in anticipation of a possible currency depreciation, inducing depletion of reserves, financial 
instability and subsequent of economic contraction. More technically, Forbes (2002) includes 
countries in a currency crisis if the local currency depreciated by 10 percent or more to US 
currency. A currency crisis occurs when market participants lose confidence in the currency 
of a particular country and seek to escape assets denominated in that currency. Because 
investors try to avoid short-term capital losses, they exit from countries where they expect 
that large nominal exchange rate depreciation will soon take place. 
Dornbusch (1996) explain that vulnerability means that if something goes wrong, then 
suddenly a lot goes wrong. Some researches show the economic vulnerability by providing 
data from micro sector.  
The relation between corporate balance sheet and currency depreciation is subject to 
several studies. Mulder, Perrelli and Rocha (2002) examine the extent to which increased 
leverage on corporate balance sheets can exacerbate macroeconomic imbalances and increase 
the likelihood of a macroeconomic crisis. They find that corporate balance sheet variables 
have a very significant impact on both the likelihood of crisis and its depth. Higher levels of 
debt and shorter maturities are associated with higher probability of a macroeconomic crisis. 
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Meanwhile, Stone (2000) investigates corporate sector dynamics during systemic financial 
crises. He documents the extent to which the crises were amplified through the corporate 
sector through exchange rate and interest rate effects.  
Claessens, Djankov and Nenova (2000) examine corporate risk measures globally and 
relate them to a variety of firm-level, institutional and macroeconomic factors. They find that 
legal origin, creditor rights and the nature of the financial system all play an important role in 
determining the level of risk that a firm is willing to hold. And Claessens, Djankov and 
Klapper (1999) studies the extent to which distressed firms exploit bankruptcy in order to 
resolve their problems and the factors, both corporate and institutional, that influences the 
bankruptcy decision. They find that ownership structure and creditor rights are important 
determinants of the use of bankruptcy. Their analysis provides considerable insight into the 
nature of bankruptcy in several countries and the conditions under which firms enter into that 
process, but they provide little insight into the factors, either within the firm or outside the 
firm, that cause firms to become distressed in the first place. 
Another strand of studies shown by Allayanis, Brown and Klapper (2003) who are 
able to decompose the capital structure of a sample of Asian firms by currency denomination. 
As a result, they are able to examine the extent to which firms that had significant foreign 
currency denominated exposures performed worse during the crisis than other firms. 
Interesting, they find that firms with higher foreign exchange exposure were also more likely 
to have foreign currency denominated revenues, allowing them to perform reasonably well 
during the crisis. They also examine the ratio of cash flow to interest expense in their analysis 
and find that use of foreign currency denominated debt did not result in additional distress for 
the borrowers.  
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2.3. Net-worth effect 
Before Asian crisis in 1997 (and Mexican and Latin American countries in 1995), little 
attention was paid to the analysis of the relation between corporate balance sheets and macro 
economic condition. The fashionable financial crisis in 1990s disclosed corporate sector 
contribution on the macro economic fragility.  
The recent literatures based on the third generation models of crisis pay more attention 
on the negative net worth effect of the currency depreciation on economies. According to this 
approach, two sources of financial fragility are the currency mismatch and maturity mismatch, 
in firm and country-level. It means therefore that financing policies or capital structure of the 
firms contribute significantly on the macro economic fragility.  
Traditional literature explains that depreciation should enhance competitiveness of the 
countries, since the price of goods for the concerned countries would be cheaper than those 
countries of competitors. Nevertheless, since most of firms (and economy) are indebted on 
foreign denominated debt and short-term maturity debt, depreciation decreases net worth of 
the firms (and economy).  
In many previous researches, it is found that the impacts of currency depreciation are 
mixed among different types of firms, industries and countries. Forbes (2002) differentiates 
several channels by which currency depreciations affect firm performance. First, depreciation 
could downgrade firm competitiveness since the cost of imported inputs raises relatively to 
foreign competitors. Second, depreciation may provide exporters with a relative cost 
advantage relative to foreign competitors. Third, depreciation could generate higher 
borrowing costs and a contraction in lending. The impact of currency depreciation should be 
based on the heterogeneity of the firms.  
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 In macro-level analysis, Kruger and Tornell (1999) provide empirical evidence that 
currency depreciation give different competitiveness effect on the different sector of economy. 
Calvo and Reinhart (2000) differentiate the impact of crisis on separate characteristic of 
countries, namely developed countries and emerging countries. They find that currency crises 
in emerging countries are more likely to have large contraction effects.  
Forbes (2002) pioneered another strand of research by linking directly currency 
depreciation and firm performance. She finds that firms with greater foreign sales exposure 
have significantly better performance after depreciations and firms with higher debt-equity 
ratios tend to have lower net income growth. Desai, Foley and Forbes (2004) find different 
responses between U.S. multinational affiliates and local firms when depreciation is present. 
U.S. multinational affiliates have higher sales, assets and investment than local firms during, 
and subsequent to, currency crisis. 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1. Data 
This chapter begins with the analysis of the financial ratio of listed companies by 
using accounting data provided by Jakarta Stock Exchange (JSX) and Indonesian Capital 
Market Directory published by ECFIN (Institute for Economic and Finance Research) in 
various publications.  
The accounting data covers the period of 1994-2004. We include all non-financial 
sectors and exclude the financial sector, since the debt structure of banks and investment 
institutions is not comparable with other sectors. All variables of data are deflated by 
wholesale price index (WPI) in 2000 for gaining a current value. This chapter includes 238 
listed companies with at least 5 consecutives years. For ownership structure, we access 
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directly to the annual report of the firms documented by JSX. In this research, we note 
ownership structure in two different periods, namely 1996 for pre-crisis ownership structure 
and 2003 for post-crisis ownership structure.  
 
3.2. Simple Models  
For capturing the general impact of currency depreciation on firm’s net worth, we 
employ equation as written in equation (1). This method is used by Forbes (2002), Desai, 
Foley and Forbes (2004) on their research for cross-country data. Firstly, we use the existing 
method as shown by equation (1). This equation measures the general impact of depreciation 
and analyzes by different characteristic of firms, namely sector (tradable versus non-tradable) 
and ownership (firm owned by foreign parties versus local parties).  
(1)  
itttttt
tttttit
TDeptTDepTDepMNCDepMNCDep
MNCDepDepDepDepInflationY
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+−+
−+−
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)1(5)1(4)(3)1(21
 
 
Equation (2) measures directly the impact of debt-equity ratio to firm value. In this 
case, we use longer period to test the interaction with debt-equity ratio. In equation (1), we 
just use three years, which are 1996 for pre-crisis period, 1998 for crisis period and 1999 for 
post-crisis period. In the equation (2), we use years from 1996 – 2000. The interest is to check 
the result of regression in each year during longer period, whether the behaviour changes each 
year. 
(2) 
it
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DepDERDep
DERDepDERDepDERDepInflationY
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where i is a subscript for each firm, and t for each year. Yit represents corporate net 
worth (asset and liabilities). Since the interest of this chapter is to measure the balance sheet 
effect of the currency depreciation, we use profitability (proxied by natural logarithm of total 
asset and sales) and the change of market capitalization3 in one side, and debt-equity ratio on 
the other side.  
Dep represents depreciation dummy. The depreciation dummy variables are 
respectively set equal 1 for observations from one year before Depreciation (t-1), the year of 
Depreciation (t) and one year after Depreciation (t+1). In this study, we include a macro 
variable for controlling the estimation, namely inflation rate4. DER is debt-equity ratio, which 
represents the level of debt.  
This chapter has three main goals. First, it intends to understand the different response 
to the currency depreciation among firms with different characteristics, such as tradable 
versus non-tradable sector and the degree of foreign ownership participation. Second, this 
study wants to understand the impact of the using debt in their firm-value. And third, it is also 
concerned with the impact of debt-equity ratio to the corporate distress probability due to 
currency depreciation.  
For equation (1), we define depreciation period as 1998, instead of 1997, because we 
assume that the impact of depreciation on the firms would be evident in the end of 1998 (not 
1997). Meanwhile, 1996 is defined as a pre-crisis period. And post-crisis period is defined as 
1999, since the fluctuation of exchange rate started to be stable.  Meanwhile, for equation (2), 
we consider longer period in examining the different impact of currency depreciation on firm 
value. In the equation (2), we employ each year from 1996 to 2000.  
                                                 
3 Change of market capitalization are calculated by equation as follows: 
)1(
)1()(
−
−−
t
tt
X
XX  
4 Measured by 
1
1
−
−−
t
tt
WPI
WPIWPI , where WPI is wholesales price index 
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For examining the general effects of currency depreciation, we use equation (1), 
whereas to test the role of debt on firm value we use equation (2). For equation (2), Our 
specific question is whether firms with higher debt-equity ratio will have less firm value, 
measured by market capitalization growth and firm profitability, following currency 
depreciation. The findings of this study are expected to be interesting in micro-level as well as 
macro-level analysis.  
The relation between currency depreciation, firm net worth and corporate distress is 
described as following figure. In the first step, currency depreciation would affect separately 
firm value (asset) and debt-equity ratio (liabilities). The impact of currency depreciation on 
firm value is examined by equation by equation (1). And then, debt-equity ration would 
induce the firm value, due to currency depreciation (equation 2).  Afterwards, firm value and 
debt-equity ratio – as firm net worth—influence directly the probability of corporate distress. 
The latter issue is addressed by equation (3).  
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Figure 4. Currency Depreciation, Firm Net-worth and Distress 
 
 
 
Note: dashed line is feedback effect, dashed-dot line represents the firm net worth 
Source: author 
 
 
3.3. Probability model 
For verifying the findings of the previous regression, especially the results from 
equation (2), we employ probit and logit model for the likelihood of financial distress. This 
chapter employs the conventional method of a discrete regression model to analyze the 
determinants of financial distress. 
The likelihood of financial distress is modelled as follows.  
(3) iii Xy μβ += '  
 
Where  
 
if yi >0, i.e. firm i is financial distress 
 
otherwise 
Currency 
depreciation 
Profitability
Market 
captitalization 
Asset 
Debt-equity 
ratio 
Firm value
Corporate 
distress 
⎩⎨
⎧=
0
1
iy
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Xi is the set of exogenous (independent) explanatory variables and μi is the error term. 
The probability of financial distress can be modelled as a logit model as follows. 
  
'exp1
'exp)1( β
β
i
i
i X
Xyprob +==  
For defining qualitative dependent variable, this chapter uses Altman Z-score to 
identify the financial vulnerability of the firms in the sample. The strategy is to set 1 for firms 
with less than median of Z-score, and 0 for those with higher than the median value. For 
proxy, we use financial ratio in 1998. Actually, the Z-Score have a range between – 4 and + 8. 
Financially sound companies show Z-score above 2.99, while those scoring below 1.81 are 
financially distressed, and face possible bankruptcy in an environment conducive to corporate 
reorganisation. Scores between 1.81 and 2.99 indicate vulnerability (Pomerleano, 1998).  
Independent variables are firm size (natural logarithm of total asset), profitability 
proxied by natural logarithm of total sales, tradable or non-tradable sector and proportion in 
foreign ownership.  
For Z-score, we adopt the equation as follows5. 
54321 999.0006.0033.0014.0012.0 XXXXXZ ++++=  
where  
X1 = working capital/total assets, 
X2 = retained earnings/total assets, 
X3 = earnings before interest and taxes/total assets, 
X4 = market value equity/book value of total liabilities, 
X5 = sales/total assets, and 
Z = overall index. 
                                                 
5 Modification of Altman in 2000, see Edward I. Altman (2000), Predicting Financial Distress of 
Companies: Revisiting the Z-score and ZETA® Models, mimeo. 
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4. Results  
4.1. General impacts  
Currency depreciation around Asian countries was started by Thai Baht depreciation 
in July 2, 1997. The impact to Indonesian Rupiah (IDR) was severe in July 24, 1997. After 
that, due to political and social problems in domestic country, depreciation of IDR becomes 
one of the most extreme depreciation cases in Asian countries. Mid-May 1998 riots sparked in 
the major cities in the country followed by the presidential succession from Soeharto to his 
vice president, BJ. Habibie6.  
Table 2. Timeline of Financial Crisis 
1997  
July 2 Thai Baht was floated and depreciated by 15-20 percent 
July 11 Widening of rupiah band 
July 24 Currency meltdown with severe pressure on baht, ringgit, peso and rupiah 
August 14 Ending of rupiah band and immediate plunge 
November 1 16 banks closed, with promise of more to follow. Deposits were not 
guaranteed 
November 5 Three-years standby agreement with IMF approved 
Mid-December Almost half of Indonesian bank deposits exit the system 
  
1998  
Mid-January Further downward pressure on the rupiah 
January 27 Bank deposits formally guaranteed by the new super-agency: Indonesia 
Bank Reconstruction Agency 
March 11 President Soeharto re-elected 
Mid-May Widespread rioting 
May 21 Vice president Habibie succeeded Suharto as president 
  
Source: taken from Blalock, Gertler and Levine 2005 
 
Table 4.3 shows the summary of descriptive statistic for some variables used in this 
study. In the post-crisis period, most listed firms in Indonesia have lower sales and assets, but 
they have much higher debt-equity ratio than in the pre-crisis period. By these descriptive 
                                                 
6 More detailed event, see chapter 1. In this chapter we just mention some relevant events for 
giving a context for our analysis  
 18
data, we have an intuition that currency depreciation has induced firm sector by deteriorating 
both sides of the corporate balance sheets: asset and liabilities.  
Meanwhile, the downgrade of sales and asset in the post-crisis period can be identified 
by the decline of mean and median of sales and asset in the post-crisis period, whereas we can 
also see that the volatility of the value of asset and sales also increase. In general, firm value 
in the post-crisis period is lower than those in the pre-crisis period.  
Table 3. Summary of Descriptive Statistic 
 
Ln(Total sales) 1996 1998 1999 
Mean 21.9974 22.2005 21.9109 
Median 22.0067 22.0844 21.9670 
Standard Deviation 1.5961 1.2740 1.7188 
Maximum 26.6212 26.6212 26.5210 
Minimum 13.7803 18.6580 14.1035 
Skewness -0.4786 0.2829 -0.5233 
Kurtosis 4.6879 3.2580 4.4671 
Observation 2458 597 1390 
    
Ln( Total asset)    
Mean 22.7002 22.9165 22.5497 
Median 22.6366 22.7551 22.4416 
Standard Deviation 1.4377 1.2822 1.4439 
Maximum 27.0816 26.9460 26.9536 
Minimum 17.4572 19.4195 18.2183 
Skewness 0.1537 0.3731 0.2430 
Kurtosis 3.0260 2.9157 2.9368 
Observation 2460 597 1392 
    
Debt-equity ratio    
Mean 0.7092 0.5038 0.7765 
Median 0.6035 0.5175 0.6290 
Standard Deviation 0.9337 0.3569 1.0363 
Maximum 30.0695 7.9127 30.0695 
Minimum 0.0004 0.0344 0.0004 
Skewness 19.0737 14.9625 17.6428 
Kurtosis 524.3631 312.3739 468.0238 
Observation 2460 597 1392 
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In 2000, the IDR experienced renewed depreciation with increased volatility. The 
Standard & Poor’s (rating agency) had also downgraded sovereign long-term and short-term 
debt (from CCC+ and C to be Selective Default/SD). All these factors had encouraged private 
individuals and corporations to sell IDR for US dollars followed by the weakening of 
exchange rate of IDR to US dollar. The IDR subsequently lost its support and weakened from 
early April 2000 due to social unrest, political uncertainties and the threat of disintegration of 
several regions in Indonesia. The main factor was the declining investor confidence in line 
with difficulties in social and political conditions ahead of the Annual Session of the People’s 
Consultative Assembly. From then until the end of 2000, the IDR weakened further due to the 
strengthening of the US dollar against major currencies during the period, coupled with 
increasing corporate demand and social unrest related to terrorist bombing acts at a number of 
religious places at year end7. 
The main concern of this research is to investigate the impact of currency depreciation 
on firm value or firm net worth based on different characteristic of the firms. Table (3) 
demonstrates the results from baseline regressions. We differentiate the impact of currency 
depreciation on firm level into two principal measurements, namely sales and asset in one 
side, and debt-equity ratio on the other side. By this distinction, we can evaluate 
simultaneously the impact of depreciation on asset and liabilities sides of corporate balance 
sheet.  
We are also concerned with the different impact of currency depreciation on different 
characteristic of the firm. And we find that firms with majority foreign ownership have a 
higher performance in sales during crises (1998) and in one year after crisis (1999). Tradable 
sector firms also have much higher sales in during and one year after crisis period than non-
                                                 
7 For further information around this issue, see BIS Papers No 24, “Foreign exchange intervention 
and policy: Bank Indonesia experiences 1997 - October 2004”. Bank of International Settlements,   
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tradable sector.  And in the case of asset, there are no significant different impacts among 
firms with different characteristics. Meanwhile, tradable sector have less debt-equity ratio 
than non-tradable sector during and in one year after crisis.  
 
4.2. Impact of debt to firm-value 
Table 4.4 provides results of regression for the impact of debt-equity ratio to the firm 
value in three different measurements, namely market capitalization growth, total sales and 
total asset. After controlling by inflation rate, we can see that in the pre-crisis period, debt-
equity ratio was not related significantly with market capitalization growth. But during crisis 
(1997 and 1998), debt equity ratio is related negatively to firm market value. It means that 
firms with higher debt-equity ratio have less market capitalization growth.  
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Table 4. Result of Regression for the General Impact of Currency Depreciation 
 
Dependent variables are natural logarithm (ln) of sales and natural logarithm (ln) of asset as proxies of firm profitability or “assets” and debt 
to equity ratio for a proxy of debt or “liability”. Estimates techniques are pooled OLS roubst (with heteroscedasticity correction from White) 
and Random Effects. Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier (LM) test is employed to choose which estimate should more efficient. *, 
**, *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. Standard deviation is reported in parentheses for specifications. 
                                                   
             Ln(Total sales)          Ln(Total asset)          Debt-equity ratio 
 OLS 
Robust 
 RE  OLS 
Robust 
 RE  OLS 
Robust 
 RE  
Inflation 0.1532  0.2993  1.1946  1.4949 *** 0.6725  0.6725  
 (0.8913)  (0.5705)  (0.8049)  (0.4025)  (0.5209)  (0.5209)  
Dep1996 0.0553  0.2277 * 0.6132 *** 0.4599 *** -0.1276  -0.1276  
 (0.1896)  (0.1203)  (0.1714)  (0.0845)  (0.1109)  (0.1109)  
Dep1998 -0.7373  -0.4546  -1.0386  -1.2820 *** -0.2513  -0.2513  
 (0.8521)  (0.5456)  (0.7695)  (0.3849)  (0.4980)  (0.4980)  
Dep1999 -0.7398 *** -0.3141 *** -0.0205  0.0001  0.3729 *** 0.3729 *** 
 (0.1788)  (0.1141)  (0.1616)  (0.0802)  (0.1046)  (0.1046)  
MNC*1996 0.3288  0.0455  -0.0907  -0.0291  0.0351  0.0351  
 (0.4332)  (0.3047)  (0.3916)  (0.2204)  (0.2534)  (0.2534)  
MNC*1998 0.5128 * 0.2657  0.1246  0.0391  -0.1307  -0.1307  
 (0.2820)  (0.1889)  (0.2549)  (0.1344)  (0.1650)  (0.1650)  
MNC*1999 0.5841 ** 0.2321  0.1506  0.0435  -0.2345  -0.2345  
 (0.2820)  (0.1889)  (0.2549)  (0.1344)  (0.1650)  (0.1650)  
Tradable*1996 0.0160  -0.3350 ** -0.3366  -0.2040 * 0.0015  0.0015  
 (0.2328)  (0.1521)  (0.2104)  (0.1075)  (0.1362)  (0.1362)  
Tradable*1998 0.6203 *** 0.0815  -0.1235  -0.1041  -0.2203 * -0.2203 * 
 (0.2188)  (0.1443)  (0.1977)  (0.1022)  (0.1280)  (0.1280)  
Continued  
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Tradable*1999 0.7371 *** 0.2688 * -0.0698  -0.0398  -0.2522 ** -0.2522 ** 
 (0.2180)  (0.1441)  (0.1971)  (0.1021)  (0.1275)  (0.1275)  
Observation 2458 *** 2458  2460  2460  2460  2460  
R-squared 0.0148  0.0082  0.008  0.006  0.0149  0.0054  
Breusch and Pagan LM test   2436.3 ***   2890.6 ***   347.18 *** 
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Table 5. Impact of Debt-Equity Ratio on Firm Value 
 
Dependent variables are market capitalization growth proxied by 
)1(
)1()(
−
−−
t
tt
X
XX , where Xt is market capitalization in year t. Natural logarithm (ln) of Total Sales 
and natural logarithm (ln) of Total Asset are included for proxies of firm value. DER is debt to equity ratio. Estimates techniques are pooled OLS robust 
(with heteroscedasticity correction from White) and Random Effects. Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier (LM) test is employed to choose which 
estimate should more efficient. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. Standard deviation is reported in parentheses for 
specifications. 
 
                    Market Cap growth  Ln(Total sales) Ln(Total asset) 
      OLS robust     Random Effect OLS-robust Random Effect OLS Robust Random Effect 
Inflation -0.8164 *** -0.8164 *** 0.0389  -0.0571  0.2056 * 0.1148 ** 
 (0.1190)  (0.2925)  (0.1318)  (0.0834)  (0.1217)  (0.0577)  
Dep96*DER 0.0623  0.0623  0.3113 *** 0.0637 ** 0.4519 * 0.0542  
 (0.1022)  (0.1969)  (0.0870)  (0.0794)  (0.2355)  (0.0530)  
Dep97*DER -0.9592 *** -0.9592 *** 0.1433  0.2075  0.5446 ** 0.6243 *** 
 (0.1384)  (0.2310)  (0.1869)  (0.0990)  (0.2181)  (0.0686)  
Dep98*DER -0.1808 ** -0.1808  -0.1403 *** -0.0015  -0.1550 *** -0.0164  
 (0.0880)  (0.2830)  (0.0357)  (0.0362)  (0.0351)  (0.0238)  
Dep99*DER 1.5271 *** 1.5271 *** -0.1297 *** -0.0171  -0.1105 *** -0.0185  
 (0.3870)  (0.1542)  (0.0179)  (0.0251)  (0.0354)  (0.0166)  
Dep00*DER -0.1968  -0.1968  -0.0840  -0.0644  0.0644  0.0065  
 (0.3371)  (0.1380)  (0.0985)  (0.0670)  (0.0913)  (0.0464)  
Observation 1945  2458  2458  2458  2460  2460  
R-squared 0.0815  0.0022  0.0075  0.0022  0.0158  0.0818  
Breusch and Pagan LM test    5.41 **   2452.97 ***   2761.54 *** 
 
 24
From table 4.5, we can learn that the negative impact of debt-equity ratio to the market 
capitalization growth due to currency depreciation was occurring in 1997 by coefficient 
correlation -0.9592. Market capitalization growth could be identified as a quick response to 
currency depreciation. Meanwhile, the negative impact of debt-equity ratio on total assets and 
total sales due to currency depreciation could be found in 1998. In 1999, the impact of debt-
equity ratio to the firm value changed to positive sign, but the signs were still negative for 
total assets and total sales.  
Compared to other countries in East Asia, on January 2006, Indonesia had a highest 
stock market indices growth. The best performing stock market in the whole period since the 
start of 2003 has been Indonesia. However, it is not the case for the fundamental performance 
of the firms. It seems that listed companies in Indonesia were ones of the worst performing 
sectors among countries in East Asia region.  
Several indicators of firm value in Indonesia show faulty condition. If we take data of 
debt equity ratio (DER) of listed companies in Indonesia, we can see that most listed firms in 
Indonesia have highest level of leverages comparing to neighbouring countries in East Asia.  
In 2004, DER of Indonesian listed companies was 68 percent or highest around East Asian 
countries. In term of firm profitability measured by return on asset (ROA), Indonesian listed 
companies were 4 percent or lowest among East Asian countries.  
For benchmark in the same year, DER in Thailand was 47 percent and ROA was 9 
percent, whereas average rate for East Asia countries was 52 percent for DER and 5 percent 
for ROA8. These data show that even though fundamental performance of listed companies in 
Indonesia is relatively weak, the price of equity in stock market seems to increase 
significantly. It leads to the explanation that equity price could not be related to fundamental 
performance of listed companies. 
                                                 
8  Further data can be found on East Asia Up-Date March 2006 titled “Solid Growth, New 
Challenges”, The World Bank  
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4.3. Corporate distress probability 
 This section tries to show the contribution of several chosen variables to predict the 
likelihood of corporate distress. This chapter uses Altman Z-score (2000) to create the 
qualitative dependent variables. For benchmark, this chapter uses the median value of the 
Altman Z score in 1998. Then, we discriminate sample into two groups, namely firms with 
high potential distress and those with low distress risk. We include firm having Z-score higher 
than median value as a healthy firm and firm whose Z-score is lower than the median value as 
a potential distress firm. We use median value for benchmark since basically higher Z-score 
means lower probability to distress and otherwise respectively.  
Table 4.6 shows the result of estimates probit and logit model. We find that three 
explanatory variables have a high significant relation to the probability of a financial distress. 
Firm size, log of sales and debt to equity ratio are significantly related to financial distress. 
Size is clearly the variable with the largest impact on financial distress.  
Table 4.6 also demonstrates that firm size enhances the likelihood of a financial distress, 
while sales reduces the likelihood of a financial distress. The results also show that debt-
equity ratio increases the probability of financial distress. For summarize, it is clearly evident 
that size and debt-equity ratio contribute positively to the financial distress, whereas firm 
profitability impedes the distress mechanism.  
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Table 6. Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Corporate Distress  
 
Pooled probit and logit regression over the period 1994 – 2004. Standard Errors are robust.  *, **, *** 
denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. Dependent variable is corporate distress 
proxied by Altman-Z score revised in 2000, as follows.  
 
Z = 0.012X1 + 0.014X2 + 0.033X3 + 0.006X4 +0.999X5.  
 
Where: X1 is working capital deflated by total assets, X2 is retained earnings deflated by total assets, X3 
is earnings before interest and taxes deflated total assets, X4 is market value equity deflated book value of 
total liabilities, X5 is sales deflated total assets, and Z is overall index. 
 
Dependent Variable: Corporate distress 
 Probit Logit 
 Parameter  Standard Error 
(Robust) 
Parameter  Standard Error 
(Robust) 
Size 0.4377 *** 0.0462 0.8400 *** 0.0957 
Ln(Sales) -0.3529 *** 0.0373 -0.6428 *** 0.0734 
DER 0.0591 ** 0.0236 0.1117 *** 0.0378 
MNC -0.0084  0.1451 -0.0302  0.3201 
N 0.1213  0.1099 0.2398  0.2399 
Constant -4.1129 *** 0.8062 -8.4593 *** 1.7595 
       
Observations 2458   2458   
Pseudo R-squared 0.1031   0.0927   
Likelihood Ratio -424.601    -429.517   
Probability LR  0.0000   0.0000   
 
By evidences provided by Table 4.6, we can also summarize that sales --as proxy of 
profitability-- is important variable to predict the competitive effect to the firm sector. 
Meanwhile, debts contribute to firms by giving a net worth effect. These findings are 
consistent with the argument of balance sheet effect in which currency depreciation induces 
corporate sector by two channels, competitiveness effect and net worth effect.  
Ownership and sector dummy have no significant impact to the likelihood of a financial 
distress. Firms with majority foreign ownership do not necessarily mean to be more healthy 
than those with less important proportion of foreign parties in the firm ownership structure. 
Anyway, tradable or non-tradable sector do not correspond to the likelihood of financial 
distress. In this case, non-tradable sector firms do not necessarily become more prone to 
distress. 
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Logit estimates give higher level of correlation. For example, one standard deviation 
increases in the firm size augments the probability of a distress by 84 percent (versus 44 
percent in probit model). Furthermore, one standard deviation increase in the debt-equity ratio 
increases the likelihood of a financial distress by 11 percent (versus 6 percent in probit model).     
 
5. Conclusion  
 The main concern of this chapter is to investigate the corporate responses to the 
currency depreciation in which financing policy is considered as important variable. 
Explicitly, the main question is whether firms with higher debt-equity ratio have lower firm 
value following currency depreciation. 
Firms with higher debt-equity ratio would have lower value in market capitalization 
growth, sales and asset during crisis and in one year after crisis. Meanwhile, firms with 
majority foreign ownership have higher sales during crisis and in one year after crisis. Firms 
in tradable sector have higher sales and less debt-equity ratio during crisis and one year after 
crisis. 
This chapter considers the mechanism of balance sheet effect by examining the impact 
of debt-equity ratio to firm value. Also, it investigates the impact of currency depreciation on 
the both, asset and liabilities sheets by employing the value of sales and asset as proxies of 
firm value. 
In investigating the balance sheet effect of currency crisis, this chapter contains 
significant discrepancies which should be due to the lack of variables, since it does not 
include the foreign debts and others variables on foreign exposure (like export and foreign 
assets). In the future research, it has to be considered in the study for gaining better 
explanation of balance sheet effect of currency depreciation.  
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